An Epistemic Logic of Extensive Games  by Lorini, Emiliano & Moisan, Frédéric
An Epistemic Logic of Extensive Games
Emiliano Lorini and Fre´de´ric Moisan
Universite´ de Toulouse, CNRS,
Institut de Recherche en Informatique de Toulouse (IRIT)
Abstract
The aim of this work is to propose a logical framework for representing interacting agents in the context
of extensive form games. Because of the importance of the temporal dimension provided by such games,
we create a modal epistemic logic that allows to quantify over both strategies and vertices within the game
tree. The ﬁrst part of the article is devoted to the logic itself with the deﬁnition of its language and
its semantics. In order to illustrate the use of this logic, we deﬁne, in the following part, the concept of
rationality in the case of extensive form games and the backward induction concept, as they are deﬁned by
Robert Aumann. Based on these deﬁnitions, we then provide a syntactic proof of Aumann’s theorem that
states the following: “for any non degenerate game of perfect information, common knowledge of rationality
implies the backward induction solution”. We ﬁnally propose an in-depth formal analysis of the hypotheses
that are needed to prove such a theorem.
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1 Introduction
The aim of this article is to propose a modal logic framework that allows to reason
about epistemic games in extensive form. In this kind of games, players decide
what to do according to some general principles of rationality while being uncertain
about several aspects of the interaction such as other agents’ choices, other agents’
preferences, etc.
While epistemic games have been extensively studied in economics (in the so-
called interactive epistemology area, see e.g. [3,2,8,5,9,11]) and while there have been
few modal logic analyses of epistemic games both in strategic form and in extensive
form (see, e.g., [22,10,8,18,26,14,23,24,4]), there exists no logic with a corresponding
formal semantics for extensive form games which has been showed to be suﬃciently
general:
• to express in the object language solution concepts like backward induction,
• to derive syntactically the epistemic and rationality conditions on which such
solution concepts are based.
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While it is shown in [23] and [24] that reasoning about actions only is suﬃcient
to compute solution concepts like the backward induction, such game logics can
not express the notion of substantive rationality as in Aumann’s deﬁnition, which
fully considers the temporal aspect of the concept of strategy. Indeed, unlike for
strategic games where a strategy can be simply reduced to a set of actions (see [14]),
a strategy in an extensive form game expresses not only the sequence of actions that
will occur next, but also the actions that would occur in every vertex of the game.In
[10] a logic which enables to reason about the epistemic aspects of extensive games is
presented. This logic deals with several game-theoretic concepts like the concepts of
knowledge, rationality and backward induction. Nevertheless, all these notions are
atomic propositions of the logic managed by an ad hoc axiomatization. Moreover,
the logical approach to extensive form games proposed in [10] is purely syntactic:
no model-theoretic analysis of extensive form games is proposed.
In this article, we try to ﬁll this gap by proposing both a semantic and a syn-
tactic analysis of extensive form games in modal logic. In particular, we introduce
a multi-modal logic interpreted on a Kripke-style semantics which integrates the
concepts of action, strategy, knowledge and preference and which allows to reason
about the properties of extensive form games. In order to illustrate the expres-
sive power of the logic, we deﬁne in its object language the well known concepts
of rationality and backward induction, as they are deﬁned according to economic
theory. Based on these deﬁnitions, we then provide a syntactic proof of Aumann’s
theorem that states the following: “for any non degenerate game of perfect infor-
mation, common knowledge of rationality implies the backward induction solution”
[1]. While there exist other logics that formalize similar theorems, none of these
is expressive enough to provide syntactic proofs that would emphasize the various
requirements assumed for the theorems. For example, while [4] presents a logic
that can correctly deﬁne the statement of Aumann’s theorem, no syntactic proof
of it is provided, and its language does not allow to verify whether the theorem
holds when the epistemic conditions are weakened. Indeed, if one realistically only
considers common knowledge to be bounded to some ﬁnite level, then the maximal
depth of the game represents an important variable to the proof of the theorem.
By considering the temporal dimension of such extensive games, we demonstrate
its relevance to the proof of some weaker version of the theorem.
Our intention, throughout this paper, is not to show that a syntactic derivation
of Aumann’s theorem is interesting in itself. Instead, we wish to demonstrate that
this kind of analysis is useful to identify speciﬁc assumptions about the relationship
between players’ knowledge and the game structure that are needed in order to
prove the theorem.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to presenting
our logic of action, strategy, knowledge and preference with the deﬁnition of its
language and its semantics. Then, in Section 3, we deﬁne the concept of rationality
in the case of extensive form games and the backward induction concept, as they
are deﬁned by Robert Aumann. Section 4 provides a syntactic proof of Aumann’s
well-known theorem as well as a systematic analysis of the hypotheses that are
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needed to prove it. Finally, in section 5, we propose some possible revisions to our
logic, which lead to a more realistic interpretation of Aumann’s theorem. Related
works on the logic of extensive games are discussed in Section 6.
A sketch of the syntactic proof of Aumann’s theorem is given in the Appendix
at the end of the article (see [13] for the fully detailed proof).
2 A modal logic of actions, strategies, knowledge and
preferences
We present in this section the modal logic ELEG (Epistemic Logic of Extensive
Games) integrating the concepts of action, strategy, knowledge and preference.
This logic supports reasoning about games in extensive form in which an agent
might be uncertain about the current choices of the other agents.
2.1 Syntax
The syntactic primitives of the logic ELEG are the ﬁnite set of agents Agt , the set
of atomic propositions Atm, a nonempty ﬁnite set of atomic action names Act =
{α1, α2, . . . , α|Act |}, a non-empty ﬁnite set of n integers I = {0, . . . , n}.
The language L of the logic ELEG is given by the following BNF:
χ ::= p | α | turni | end | ki
ϕ ::= χ | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ϕ | AXϕ | [Ki]ϕ | Xϕ
where p ranges over Atm, i ranges over Agt , α ranges over Act , and k ranges over
I. Formulas χ are called atomic formulas. The classical Boolean connectives ⊥, ,
∧, → and ↔ are deﬁned from ∨ and ¬ in the usual manner.
The formula α has to be read “the action α is performed”, while turni and ki
are read respectively “it is agent i’s turn to play”, and “the current strategy will
ensure a payoﬀ k to agent i”. Finally, end is meant to stand for “the current vertex
of the game is an end vertex”.
The operator  is used to quantify over strategies of the current game. ϕ has
to be read “ϕ holds for all strategies of the current extensive game”. The operator
AX is used to quantify over next vertices of the current extensive game. AXϕ has
to be read “ϕ is true at every possible next vertex along the current strategy”.
The formula [Ki]ϕ is read as usual “agent i knows that ϕ is true”. X is the
standard temporal operator of next. The formula Xϕ has to be read “ϕ will be true
next”.
Moreover, the following abbreviations are given:
ϕ
def
= ¬¬ϕ AX0ϕ def= ϕ
EXϕ
def
= ¬AX¬ϕ AXn+1ϕ def= AX(AXnϕ)
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〈Ki〉ϕ def= ¬[Ki]¬ϕ AX≤nϕ def=
∧
0≤m≤n AX
mϕ
αi
def
= α ∧ turni EXnϕ def= ¬AXn¬ϕ
X0ϕ
def
= ϕ EX≤nϕ def= ¬AX≤n¬ϕ
Xn+1ϕ
def
= XXnϕ
ϕ has to be read “ϕ holds for at least one strategy of the current extensive game”,
whereas EXϕ has to read “ϕ is true in at least one possible next vertex along the
current strategy”. 〈Ki〉ϕ has to be read “agent i thinks that ϕ is possible”, whereas
αi has to be read “agent i performs the action α”. X
n has to be read “ϕ will be
true n steps from now”. Operators AXnϕ and AX≤nϕ respectively read “ϕ is true
in every vertex that can be reached in exactly n step(s) from now, along the current
strategy” and “ϕ is true in every vertex that can be reached within n step(s) from
now, along the current strategy”. Finally the corresponding dual operators EXnϕ
and EX≤nϕ can be interpreted as “ϕ is true in at least one vertex that can be
reached in exactly n step(s) from now, along the current strategy” and “ϕ is true in
at least one vertex that can be reached within n step(s) from now, along the current
strategy”.
As common in Propositional Dynamic Logic (PDL), we introduce an operator
of sequential composition “;”. We deﬁne the set Seq of action sequences as the
smallest set such that: α ∈ Seq for any α ∈ Act , and if 1, 2 ∈ Seq then 1;2 ∈ Seq .
Moreover, we consider Seqn ⊆ Seq to be the set of action sequences of length n.
The fact that a given action sequence will occur and ϕ will be true afterwards can
be deﬁned in the object language by means of the following deﬁnition:
〈α0; . . . ;αn〉ϕ def=
∧
0≤l≤n
Xlαl ∧ Xnϕ
We use [EKC ]ϕ as an abbreviation of
∧
i∈C [Ki]ϕ, i.e. every agent in C knows ϕ
(if C = ∅ then [EKC ]ϕ is equivalent to ). Then we deﬁne by induction [EKkC ]ϕ for
every natural number k ∈ N:
[EK0C ]ϕ
def
= ϕ
and for all k ≥ 1,
[EKkC ]ϕ
def
= [EKC ]([EK
k−1
C ]ϕ)
Similarly, we deﬁne for all natural numbers n ∈ N:
[CK0C ]ϕ
def
= ϕ
and for all n ≥ 1,
[CKnC ]ϕ
def
=
∧
1≤k≤n
[EKkC ]ϕ
[CKnC ]ϕ expresses C’s mutual knowledge that ϕ up to n iterations, i.e. everyone in
C knows ϕ, everyone in C knows that everyone in C knows ϕ, and so on until level
n.
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2.2 Semantics
A strategic structure includes a set of vertices, a set of strategies, a successor func-
tion associating vertices and strategies to vertices, a turn-taking function assigning
agents to vertices. The set of vertices includes end vertices.
Deﬁnition 2.1 [Strategic structure] A strategic structure is a tuple T =
〈V ,Q, S,next ,EndV 〉 where:
• V is a non-empty set of vertices;
• Q is total function Q : V −→ Agt mapping vertices to agents;
• S is a nonempty set of strategies on V , and every strategy s ∈ S is a total function
s : V −→ Act mapping vertices to actions;
• next is a partial function next : V × S −→ V mapping vertices and strategies to
vertices such that:
C1 if s(w) = s′(w) then next(w, s) = next(w, s′);
• EndV ⊆ V is the set of end vertices such that:
C2 w ∈ EndV if and only if, next(w, s) is undeﬁned for every s.
Q(w) = i means that at vertex w it is agent i’s turn to play, and next(w, s) = w′
means that w′ is the next vertex of w with respect to the strategy s. We call index
a pair (w, s) with w ∈ V and s ∈ S. We deﬁne H = V × S the set of all indices.
Note that the particular concept of a strategy in Deﬁnition 2.1 considers every
vertex of the game and is not restricted to a single player’s moves as usually done
in game theory. However, for every s ∈ S, a single player i’s strategy si can be
deﬁned as the restriction of s to the vertices in which it is agent i’s turn to play.
According to the Constraint C1, two strategies selecting the same action at a
given vertex lead to the same next vertex. According to the constraint C2, an end
vertex is a vertex which does not have a next vertex.
Deﬁnition 2.2 [Successor] R is a relation on vertices such that:
for every w, v ∈ V , wRv if and only if there is s ∈ S such that next(w, s) = v.
wRv means that vertex v is a successor of vertex w.
An extensive game model is nothing but a strategic structure supplemented with
accessibility relations for agents’ knowledge over strategies, agents’ preferences and
a valuation of atomic propositions.
Deﬁnition 2.3 [Extensive game model] An extensive game model is a tuple
M = 〈T, {Ei | i ∈ Agt}, {Pi | i ∈ Agt}, π〉 where:
• T is a strategic structure;
• Every Ei is an equivalence relation on S such that:
C3 if sEis′ and Q(w) = i, then s(w) = s′(w);
• every Pi is a total function Pi : H −→ I mapping every index to an integer such
that:
C4 if next(w, s) = w′, then Pi(w, s) = k if and only if Pi(w′, s) = k;
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C5 if w ∈ EndV and s(w) = s′(w) then Pi(w, s) = Pi(w, s′).
• π : Atm −→ 2H is a valuation function on indices.
sEis′ means that agent i cannot distinguish the strategy s from the strategy s′.
Pi(w, s) = k means that the strategy s played at the vertex w will ensure a payoﬀ
k to agent i.
Constraint C3 is the assumption that every agent knows his choice when it is his
turn to play [1,5]. Constraint C4 correctly expresses the fact that in an extensive
form game, preferences are built over histories, where a history is nothing but a
sequence of indices (w0, s), . . . , (wn, s), . . . such that next(wi, s) = wi+1 for every
0 ≤ i. According to the Constraint C5, two strategies selecting the same action at
an end vertex lead to the same payoﬀ for an agent. In other words, at an end vertex
the payoﬀ of an action is uniquely determined.
Deﬁnition 2.4 [Truth conditions] Truth of a formula in a model M at a given
index (w, s) is deﬁned as follows:
• M,w, s |= p iﬀ (w, s) ∈ π(p);
• M,w, s |= ¬ϕ iﬀ M,w, s |= ϕ;
• M,w, s |= ϕ ∨ ψ iﬀ M,w, s |= ϕ or M,w, s |= ψ;
• M,w, s |= α iﬀ s(w) = α;
• M,w, s |= turni iﬀ Q(w) = i;
• M,w, s |= end iﬀ w ∈ EndV ;
• M,w, s |= ki iﬀ Pi(w, s) = k;
• M,w, s |= Xϕ iﬀ if next(w, s) is deﬁned then M,next(w, s), s |= ϕ;
• M,w, s |= ϕ iﬀ M,w, s′ |= ϕ for all s′ ∈ S;
• M,w, s |= AXϕ iﬀ M,w′, s |= ϕ for all w′ ∈ V such that wRw′;
• M,w, s |= [Ki]ϕ iﬀ M,w, s′ |= ϕ for all s′ such that sEis′.
A formula ϕ is true in an extensive game model M iﬀ M,w, s |= ϕ for every
vertex w in V and every strategy s in S. ϕ is ELEG-valid (noted |= ϕ) iﬀ ϕ is true
in all extensive game models. ϕ is ELEG-satisﬁable iﬀ ¬ϕ is not ELEG-valid.
2.3 Some validities
Table 1 provides an exhaustive list of ELEG validities that will be suﬃcient to
provide in Section 4 a syntactic proof of Aumann’s theorem.
Let us prove the validity Perm[Ki],AX as an example. AssumeM,w, s |= [Ki]AXϕ
for an arbitrary ELEG model M . This is equivalent to say that M,w, s′ |= AXϕ
for all s′ such that sEis′ which, in turn, is equivalent to say that M,w′, s′ |= ϕ
for all (w′, s′) such that sEis′ and wRw′. The latter is equivalent to say that
M,w′, s |= [Ki]ϕ for all w′ such that wRw′ which, in turn, is equivalent to say that
M,w, s |= AX[Ki]ϕ.
In the sequel, we will write ELEG ϕ to mean that ϕ can be derived by means
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All principles of classical propositional logic(CPL)
All S5 principles for (S5)
All S5 principles for every [Ki](S5[Ki])
All K principles for X(KX)
All K principles for AX(KAX)
Xϕ ∨ X¬ϕ(DetX)
end ↔ X⊥(EndVert)
ϕ → [Ki]ϕ(PerfectInfo)
AXϕ ↔ AXϕ(Perm,AX)
Xϕ ↔ AXϕ(NxtVert)
[Ki]AXϕ ↔ AX[Ki]ϕ(Perm[Ki],AX)
turni → turni(TurnStr)
AXϕ → Xϕ(TimeVert)
turni → (α → [Ki]α)(Aware) ∨
k∈I
ki(CompletePref)
ki → ¬hi if k 	= h(SinglePref) ∨
α∈Act
α(OneAct)
α → ¬β if α 	= β(SingleAct)
∨
i∈Agt
turni(TurnTaking)
turni → ¬turnj if i 	= j(SingleTurn)
¬end → (ki ↔ Xki)(TimePref)
(end ∧ α ∧ ki) → (α → ki)(EndAct)
(α ∧ Xϕ) → (α → Xϕ)(StrAct)
Table 1
Some validities of ELEG
of the list of principles given in Table 1. The study of a complete axiomatization of
the logic ELEG is postponed to future work.
3 Backward induction and rationality
We here deﬁne two fundamental concepts in Aumann’s epistemic analysis of exten-
sive form games: the concept of backward induction and the concept of rationality.
As a matter of simplicity to later prove Aumann’s Theorem, we only provide in
this section simpliﬁed formal deﬁnitions that only apply to games of uniform depth.
One should note however that more general deﬁnitions of both backward induction
and rationality can easily be expressed in ELEG.
3.1 Backward induction
The notion of backward induction represents the process of reasoning backwards in
time, starting from each end vertex of the game in order to determine a sequence
of optimal actions. This method is generally used to compute the subgame perfect
Nash equilibria in sequential games. The backward induction (BI) solution in a
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game of depth n (i.e. where at most n steps are necessary to reach an end vertex of
the game) can be computed by iterating the process n times, as the BI solution at
one state relies on the BI solution at every possible successive state. Therefore, the
ﬁrst step BI solution (n = 0) corresponds to the maximization of preferences for the
last player to play at each possible end vertex of the game. The BI solution after n
(n > 0) steps corresponds to the maximization of the current player’s preferences,
considering only those that satisfy the BI solution after n− 1 steps at any possible
next state.
The recursive formal deﬁnition in ELEG of the BI solution after n steps is as
follows.
For the case n = 0 we deﬁne:
BI0
def
= end ∧
∨
i∈Agt ,k∈I
(turni ∧ ki ∧(
∨
h∈I:h≤k
hi))
For every n > 0 we deﬁne:
BIn
def
= ¬end ∧
∨
i∈Agt ,k∈I
(turni ∧ ki ∧ AX(BIn−1 ∧
∨
h∈I:h≤k
hi))
Therefore: M,w, s |= BIn if and only if the current strategy s, when starting
from vertex w, corresponds to a backward induction solution that can be computed
in n steps.
3.2 Epistemic rationality
The following ELEG deﬁnition characterizes a notion of rationality that is supposed
in Aumann’s epistemic analysis of extensive form games:
Ratendi
def
= (end ∧ turni) →
∨
k∈I
(ki ∧(
∨
h∈I:h≤k
hi))
Ratendi means that an agent i is rational at an end vertex (i.e. at some end vertex
of the game) if and only if i chooses an action that maximizes his individual payoﬀ.
Note that in this case, rationality does not rely on any epistemic component.
Rat¬endi
def
= (¬end ∧ turni) →
∨
k∈I
〈Ki〉(ki ∧ AX(
∨
h∈I:h≤k
〈Ki〉hi))
Rat¬endi means that an agent i is rational at any intermediate vertex (any node
that is not an end vertex of the game) if and only if i chooses an action in such a
way that what he considers possible to happen afterwards is not strictly dominated
by some alternative future he would consider, had he chosen any other action. In
other words, as every possible next vertex corresponds to one of i’s possible actions,
i is rational if and only if each of these vertices is not strictly dominated, according
to i’s uncertainty, by the next actual vertex (corresponding to the actual action
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chosen by i).
Rati
def
= Ratendi ∧ Rat¬endi
Note that introspection on rationality is expressed by the following valid formula
of ELEG:
Rati ↔ [Ki]Rati
4 A syntactic proof of Aumann’s theorem
As already stated in the previous section, a fundamental assumption of Aumann’s
theorem is that the game is in “general position”, i.e. every history of the game is
associated to a unique preference value for every agent. This important notion can
be deﬁned in the logic ELEG in the following way:
GenPosn
def
=
∧
0≤h≤n
∧
k∈I,i∈Agt ,∈Seqh
AX≤n((ki ∧ 〈〉end) → (〈〉end ↔ ki))
In our syntactic proof of Aumann’s theorem we only consider game structures
with uniform depth, that is, games whose end vertices have the same distance from
a given vertex.
The following construction Depthn means that “the current game has a uniform
depth of degree n from the current vertex”. In other words, no matter what actions
will be chosen in the future, an end vertex will be reached in exactly n steps. This
concept is thus captured by the following ELEG formula:
Depthn
def
= (X)nend
This assumption, which is not stated in Aumann’s original theorem, is used
here only to simplify the formal proof. One should note however that any extensive
game can be represented by an extensive game with uniform depth (i.e. by adding
additional non informative actions and preferences).
According to Aumann’s theorem, the following constraints must be satisﬁed in
order for the current strategy to be a backward induction solution:
• the game is ﬁnite;
• the game has a uniform depth of degree n from the current vertex;
• the game is in the general position;
• there is common knowledge up to level at least n that at every future vertex (up
to depth n) all agents are rational.
Theorem 4.1 For every n,m ∈ N such that n ≤ m, we have:
ELEG ([CKmAgt ]AX≤n(
∧
i∈Agt
Rati) ∧ Depthn ∧ GenPosn) → BIn
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Note that the proof of Theorem 4.1 only requires to prove the case where m = n
because of Axiom T for every [Ki] modal operator.
The proof of theorem 4.1 in the Appendix indicates several points that need to
be discussed. A strong assumption made in the theorem is about the type of ratio-
nality that is used. In fact, Aumann’s theorem considers substantive rationality in
the hypothesis, which means that in every vertex of the game, the players will be
rational. Such a deﬁnition is criticizable because it requires players to be even ratio-
nal in vertices that will never be reached given some expected strategy. According
to Stalnaker [19] 1 , a more realistic concept of rationality should be considered only
on the vertices that are actually reached. However, the latter deﬁnition does not
guarantee the backward induction solution. Our proof of the theorem suggests that
this deﬁnition of substantive rationality is indeed important to the derivation of
the equilibrium solution. To be even more precise, the use of Axiom Perm[Ki],AX
in the proof of Theorem 4.1 indicates that common knowledge of substantive ra-
tionality must be true not only now but in every future vertex. Obviously Axiom
Perm[Ki],AX is very strong as it assumes that players know at the beginning of the
game what they will do at any reachable state in the future where they have to play.
This simply means that players can not learn anything through the game play.
5 A more convenient characterization of knowledge
Following the previous analysis of the syntactic proof of Aumann’s theorem, we
propose to revise our logic by providing a more realistic interpretation of Aumann’s
theorem.
First, one can note from the syntactic proof in the Appendix that Aumann’s
theorem can be weakened through a reinterpretation of the epistemic operator.
Indeed, every proof step from Theorem 4.1 using Axiom T for the S5 knowledge
operator [Ki] can still be proved usingKD45 principles for the belief modal operator.
Such an observation implies that a simple notion of belief (which is not necessarily
truthful) is suﬃcient to prove Aumann’s theorem. The detailed proof of Theorem
4.1 in the Appendix shows that such a weakening of the epistemic operator is made
possible mainly by Axiom Aware that requires agents to have introspection on
their own performing action.In other words, agents always believe without a doubt
what they’ll actually perform.
Moreover, the epistemic operator still remains unrealistic as it restricts agents
to only consider static uncertainty over strategies (i.e. agents have the same un-
certainty regarding strategies no matter which vertex they are in) and therefore
prevents them to learn through the game. Hence in order to be more realistic, we
here interpret the epistemic modal operator by means of an equivalence epistemic
relation Ewi on strategies for every agent i ∈ Agt and vertex w ∈ W . In this case,
agents’ uncertainty over strategies can change through time.
Given this change on the epistemic relation, the truth condition of the knowledge
1 See also [12] for a discussion.
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operator then becomes:
• M,w, s |= [Ki]ϕ iﬀ M,w, s′ |= ϕ for all s′ such that sEwi s′.
Considering this new epistemic relation Ewi , the previous constraint C3 has to
be reformulated as follows:
C3∗ if sEwi s′ and Q(w) = i, then s(w) = s(w)′
Moreover, the following constraints need to be introduced in order to keep Axiom
Perm[Ki],AX as in Table 1:
C6 if sEvi s′ and wRv then sEwi s′
C7 if sEwi s′ and wRv then sEvi s′
According to constraint C6, agents will never forget their current uncertainty
over strategies in every reachable vertex. In other words, C6 simply means that
agents will always have a perfect recall of their past uncertainty throughout the
game. According to constraint C7, agents are always aware of their future uncer-
tainty over strategies in every reachable vertex. In other words, C7 means that
agents will never be able to discard strategies and therefore learn as they advance
through time.
Let us provide the axiom corresponding to constraint C6:
[Ki]AXϕ → AX[Ki]ϕ(Perm∗[Ki],AX)
Note that Axiom Perm∗[Ki],AX is simply a weaker version of the initial Axiom
Perm[Ki],AX from Table 1. It is clearly showed in the Appendix that constraint C6
along with its corresponding Axiom Perm∗[Ki],AX are suﬃcient to the syntactic proof
of Theorem 4.1. Such an observation simply implies that Aumann’s theorem holds
even though agents are learning through the game (i.e. constraint C7, which is not
necessary, can be removed). However, this analysis also indicates that Aumann’s
theorem requires agents to have perfect recall through the game. In other words,
for the theorem to be correct, players should never forget anything as they advance
in time.
6 Related works
We are not the ﬁrst to provide a logical analysis of extensive games. Several logical
systems have been proposed which support reasoning about this class of games. We
here discuss some of these systems and compare them with our logic ELEG.
In [21], van Benthem analyzes extensive games using diﬀerent modal languages
such as propositional dynamic logic (PDL), PDL with converse, and a modal forcing
language which allows to express what a player can bring about in a given extensive
game, no matter what the other players do. Moreover, he also studies a variety
of notions of game equivalence based on the notion of bisimulation. Although van
Benthem shows how PDL extended with epistemic operators can represent extensive
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games with imperfect information, he does not consider the concept of rationality
which is a fundamental element of Aumann’s epistemic analysis of extensive games.
It is worth noting that, diﬀerently from our logic ELEG, standard PDL would fail
to deﬁne such a concept, because it can neither identify the current strategy that is
going to be played nor express what will be true at every possible next vertex along
the current strategy (which is done through the operator AX in ELEG). Moreover,
our logic ELEG shows that deﬁning strategies explicitly in the object language —
as done in PDL — is not necessary to express interesting game-theoretic concepts
such as rationality and backward induction.
Related to van Benthem’s work is Ramanujan & Simon’s work [17,16] who have
recently proposed an elegant approach to extensive games based on dynamic logic.
However, Ramanujan & Simon do not deal with epistemic aspects of extensive
games, as their logic does not have operators for representing epistemic states of
players. The game logic presented in [15] also lacks epistemic operators, therefore
preventing a formalization of the concept of epistemic rationality and a logical
analysis of Aumann’s theorem. Bonanno’s logical account of extensive games [7,6]
has the same limitation. He proposes a variant of dynamic logic extended with
temporal operators for (branching) future and (linear) past and shows how his logic
can be used to characterize the solution concept of backward induction. 2 But, like
Ramanujan & Simon’s logic, Bonanno’s logic does not have epistemic operators
which are required to represent Aumann’s notion of rationality and the statement
of Aumann’s theorem. The same remark also applies to some recent work [20],
which presents a similar logical approach to extensive games without considering
the epistemic aspects.
ATL-based approaches to extensive games presented in [28] and [25] come closer
to our current approach. For instance, in [28] a variant of ATL (Alternating-time
temporal logic) with explicit strategies called ATEL (Alternating-time logic with
explicit strategies) is proposed which allows to deﬁne solution concepts such as
backward induction. The interesting aspect of ATEL, compared to ATL, is that
one can explicitly reason about strategies in the object language. However, like
Ramanujan & Simon and Bonanno, ATEL misses epistemic operators necessary
to deﬁne Aumann’s notion of rationality. Another important diﬀerence between
ATEL and our logic ELEG is that in ATEL formulas are interpreted with respect
to states, whereas in ELEG they are interpreted with respect to state/strategy
pairs (in this sense, ELEG semantics is bidimensional). The latter is an advantage
because, diﬀerently from ATEL, it is possible in ELEG to reason about what will
be true at every possible next vertex along the current strategy. We have shown
that this is fundamental for expressing in the object language Aumann’s notion of
rationality and the statement of Aumann’s theorem.
In [27], the authors propose an alternative way of proving Aumann’s theorem
by using a purely proof-theoretic approach based on type theory. Diﬀerently from
2 Bonanno’s logic has four kinds of operators for past and future describing: (1) what is going to be the
case at every future vertex of the game tree, (2) what has always been the case at every past vertex, (3)
what is going to be the case at every predicted future vertex of the game tree, and (4) what has always been
the case at every past vertex at which today was predicted.
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Vestergaard et al.’s approach, our approach based on modal logic has the advantage
of combining a proof-theoretic analysis of extensive games — which is what we have
done in Section 4 — with a model-theoretic semantics.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have introduced a logical framework that provides an alternative
way of representing extensive form games as compared to their usual speciﬁcation
in economics.
We showed that our logic is suﬃciently general for our purpose to reason about
dynamic epistemic games, as illustrated by the well known concepts of rationality
and backward induction. Although these concepts have been extensively studied in
economics, very few logical analyses have been proposed up to now. While several
related works discuss and present some logical approaches to epistemic reasoning
in such extensive games, none of these deﬁne a logic expressive enough to represent
syntactically both the epistemic concepts and the equilibrium solutions. By the for-
mal syntactic proof of Aumann’s theorem, we demonstrate that our logic is capable
to ﬁll this gap and provide further interesting information about them.
In addition to providing a complete axiomatization of our logic, we intend in
future work to investigate some extensions of the logic ELEG. While the language
of the logic presented here is restricted to reason about the future only, the current
semantics can be extended to reason also about the past and every possible counter-
factual situation. This represents another research direction that we also consider
to study further.
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A Appendix
Because of space restrictions, we only provide a sketch of the proof of Aumann’s Theorem.
Here are the Lemmas needed to prove Theorem 4.1:
(i) ELEG [CKn+1Agt ]AXnAllRat → [CKnAgt ]AXnAllRat
(ii) ELEG (Depthn ∧ GenPosn ∧ ki ∧ BIn) → (BIn → ki)
Moreover, to make the proof of Theorem 4.1 more readable, we use the following abbreviation:
AllRat
def
=
∧
i∈Agt Rati
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A.1 Syntactic proof of theorem 4.1
It is straightforward to show that Aumann’s theorem can be reformulated as follows:
ELEG (
∧
0≤m≤n
[CKmAgt ]AX
mAllRat ∧ Depthn ∧ GenPosn) → BIn
We therefore prove this theorem inductively:
Basic case n=0:
Here, we prove ELEG AllRat ∧ end ∧ GenPos0 → BI0.
(i) ELEG (AllRat ∧ end ∧ GenPos0)
→ ∨i∈Agt (end ∧ turni ∧
∨
k∈I ki ∧ (
∨
h∈I:k≥h hi)
by the deﬁnitions of Rati and Rat
end
i , and Axiom TurnTaking;
(ii) ELEG (AllRat ∧ end ∧ GenPos0) → BI0
by i and the deﬁnition of BI0;
Inductive case:
Let n ∈ N and let us prove that if the theorem is true for all k ≤ n, then it is true for n+ 1.
(i) ELEG (
∧
0≤m≤n+1[CK
m
Agt ]AX
mAllRat ∧ Depthn+1 ∧ GenPosn+1)
→ AX(∧0≤m≤n[CKmAgt ]AXmAllRat ∧ Depthn ∧ GenPosn)
by the deﬁnitions of Depthn+1 and GenPosn+1, Lemma i, and Axiom Perm[Ki],AX (or Perm
∗
[Ki],AX
);
(ii) ELEG (
∧
0≤m≤n+1[CK
m
Agt ]AX
mAllRat ∧ Depthn+1 ∧ GenPosn+1)
→ [EK1Agt ]AX(
∧
0≤m≤n[CK
m
Agt ]AX
mAllRat ∧ Depthn ∧ GenPosn)
by the deﬁnitions of Depthn+1 and GenPosn+1, and Axiom Perm[Ki],AX (or Perm
∗
[Ki],AX
);
(iii) ELEG (
∧
0≤m≤n[CK
m
Agt ]AX
mAllRat ∧ Depthn ∧ GenPosn) → BIn
by induction;
(iv) ELEG (
∧
0≤m≤n+1[CK
m
Agt ]AX
mAllRat ∧ Depthn+1 ∧ GenPosn+1)
→ AXBIn ∧ [EK1Agt ]AXBIn
by i, ii and iii;
(v) ELEG (
∧
0≤m≤n+1[CK
m
Agt ]AX
mAllRat ∧ Depthn+1 ∧ GenPosn+1)
→ AX(∨k∈I ki∧BIn∧[Kj ]BIn∧Depthn∧GenPosn)∧[Kj ]AX(
∨
k∈I ki∧BIn∧[Kj ]BIn∧Depthn∧GenPosn)
by iv, the deﬁnitions of Depthn+1 and GenPosn+1, Axioms CompletePref and Perm[Ki],AX (or
Perm∗
[Ki],AX
), and Axiom 4 for [Ki];
(vi) ELEG (
∧
0≤m≤n+1[CK
m
Agt ]AX
mAllRat ∧ Depthn+1 ∧ GenPosn+1)
→ ∨i∈Agt,α∈Act turni ∧ αi ∧ [Ki]αi ∧ X
∨
k∈I (BIn → ki)
by v, Lemma ii, and Axioms TurnTaking, TimeVert, OneAct, and Aware;
(vii) ELEG (
∧
0≤m≤n+1[CK
m
Agt ]AX
mAllRat ∧ Depthn+1 ∧ GenPosn+1)
→ ∨i∈Agt,α∈Act turni ∧ αi ∧ [Ki]αi ∧
∨
k∈I (αi → X(BIn → ki))
by vi and Axiom StrAct;
(viii) ELEG (
∧
0≤m≤n+1[CK
m
Agt ]AX
mAllRat ∧ Depthn+1 ∧ GenPosn+1)
→ ∨i∈Agt turni ∧ XBIn ∧ [Ki]XBIn ∧
∨
k∈I X(BI
n → ki) ∧ [Ki]X(BIn → ki)
by vii and iv, Axioms PerfectInfo and TimeVert, Axiom T for , Axiom K for [Ki], and boolean
principles;
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(ix) ELEG (
∧
0≤m≤n+1[CK
m
Agt ]AX
mAllRat ∧ Depthn+1 ∧ GenPosn+1)
→ ∨i∈Agt,k∈I turni ∧ Xki ∧ [Ki]Xki
by viii and Axiom K for [Ki] and X;
(x) ELEG (
∧
0≤m≤n+1[CK
m
Agt ]AX
mAllRat ∧ Depthn+1 ∧ GenPosn+1)
→ ∨i∈Agt,k∈I turni ∧ ki ∧ [Ki]ki
by ix and Axiom TimePref ;
(xi) ELEG (
∧
0≤m≤n+1[CK
m
Agt ]AX
mAllRat ∧ Depthn+1 ∧ GenPosn+1)
→ [Kj ]AX([Kj ]BIn ∧
∨
k∈I ki ∧ (BIn → ki))
by v and Lemma ii;
(xii) ELEG (
∧
0≤m≤n+1[CK
m
Agt ]AX
mAllRat ∧ Depthn+1 ∧ GenPosn+1)
→ [Kj ]AX(
∨
k∈I ki ∧ [Kj ]ki)
by xi, Axiom PerfectInfo, and Axiom K for [Kj ];
(xiii) ELEG (
∧
0≤m≤n+1[CK
m
Agt ]AX
mAllRat ∧ Depthn+1 ∧ GenPosn+1)
→ ∨i∈Agt (turni ∧
∨
k∈I〈Ki〉(ki ∧ AX
∨
h∈I:h≤k〈Ki〉hi) ∧ [Ki]AX
∨
h∈I(hi ∧ [Ki]hi))
by xii, the deﬁnitions of Rati and Rat
¬end
i , Axiom TurnTaking, and boolean principles;
(xiv) ELEG (
∧
0≤m≤n+1[CK
m
Agt ]AX
mAllRat ∧ Depthn+1 ∧ GenPosn+1)
→ ∨i∈Agt (turni ∧
∨
k∈I〈Ki〉(ki ∧ AX
∨
h∈I:h≤k hi))
by xiii, Axiom SinglePref , and Axiom T for [Ki] (or Axiom D if [Ki] is KD45 modal operator);
(xv) ELEG (
∧
0≤m≤n+1[CK
m
Agt ]AX
mAllRat ∧ Depthn+1 ∧ GenPosn+1)
→ ∨i∈Agt (turni ∧
∨
k∈I〈Ki〉(ki ∧ AX(BIn →
∨
h∈I:h≤k hi)))
by xiv and v, Lemma ii, and Axiom T for [Ki] (or Axiom D if [Ki] is KD45 modal operator);
(xvi) ELEG (
∧
0≤m≤n+1[CK
m
Agt ]AX
mAllRat ∧ Depthn+1 ∧ GenPosn+1)
→ ∨i∈Agt (turni ∧
∨
k∈I〈Ki〉ki ∧ AX(BIn →
∨
h∈I:h≤k hi))
by xv, Axioms Perm,AX and PerfectInfo, and Axioms T and 5 for ;
(xvii) ELEG (
∧
0≤m≤n+1[CK
m
Agt ]AX
mAllRat ∧ Depthn+1 ∧ GenPosn+1)
→ ∨i∈Agt (turni ∧
∨
k∈I〈Ki〉ki ∧ AX(BIn ∧
∨
h∈I:h≤k hi))
by xvi and iv, and Axiom K for AX;
(xviii) ELEG (
∧
0≤m≤n+1[CK
m
Agt ]AX
mAllRat ∧ Depthn+1 ∧ GenPosn+1)
→ ¬end ∧∨i∈Agt (turni ∧
∨
k∈I ki ∧ AX(
∨
h∈I:h≤k hi ∧ BIn))
by xvii and x, the deﬁnition of Depthn+1, and boolean principles;
(xix) ELEG (
∧
0≤m≤n+1[CK
m
Agt ]AX
mAllRat ∧ Depthn+1 ∧ GenPosn+1)
→ BIn+1
by xviii and the deﬁnition of BIn+1;
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